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Limits to Partnerships: Mark Prebble 
Abstract: 
Networks, collaboration and partnerships between the government and community groups offer 
prospects for stronger governance and improved public value. Many authors have reported on 
processes that enhance the prospects for successful collaborations, especially in handling intractable 
issues, but few have examined the limits to partnerships. A simple theory of government (involving 
the efforts of"reasonable people") is devised to explore the issues in creating sustainable partnerships. 
A graphical presentation is used to demonstrate that successful partnerships rely on more than good 
management; their success also depends on their effects on the rest of the polity, and the response to 
those effects. These processes limit the potential for partnerships to offer a general solution to 
problems of governance. Three conditions for sustainable partnerships are derived; benefit, support 
and acceptability. Attention to good network management, political risks and sound public 
administration can improve the prospects for a successful and sustainable partnership, but eventually 
(like other forms of human endeavour) there are limits to partnerships. 
Keywords: Partnership; Reasonable person; Ideal state; Limits 
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Introduction 
In November 2012, editorial writers in New Zealand (Dominion-Post, 2012) thundered about 
mismanagement ofWhanau Ora, a two-year-old partnership program administered by Te 
Puni Kokiri (the Department of Maori Affairs). The program aims at improving the capacity 
of Maori groups (and others) to organise social services for their communities. 
There was some basis for the newspaper's complaints. An evaluation the department had 
commissioned found that lack of data meant it was "not able to tell a robust and convincing 
story'' to demonstrate that the program had contributed to healthy lifestyles, economic 
security or other program goals (Wehipeihana 2012, p34). And in the week the evaluation 
was released, a gang member was convicted in Dunedin for diverting $20,000 of program 
funds to purchase cannabis (Otago Daily Times, 2012). The political response was 
immediate, as opposition politicians demanded better controls on government spending 
(Chapman, 2012). 
On the other hand, the evaluation also reported strong favourable community responses and 
improved community dynamics, and $20,000 is not a large share out of a total program spend 
of$12.6 million. Perhaps the administration ofWhanau Ora is no worse than some 
mainstream programs but, because it is intended to involve non-officials in decision-making 
and delivery, Whanau Ora presents significant management challenges. 
Whanau Ora is just one of many programs and initiatives worldwide that aim to improve 
flexibility of management so that communities can achieve better results. The basic idea is 
that communities understand their particular needs and will respond more constructively to 
activities that are delivered in a way that is sensitive to their preferences. Much academic 
commentary has favoured partnerships as a way of the future, and has suggested various 
m,magement processes to improve their chance of success. 
However, the political response to developments in the Whanau Ora program suggests that 
management may not be the only issue. This paper argues that partnerships should not be 
seen solely through a management lens. In essence, partnerships (as the term is used in this 
paper) involve some form of special interaction between officials and members of a 
community. In the partnership, officials focus on the needs of the community (where 
community refers to some sub-set of the polity), but they work for the government which 
operates on behalf of the whole polity. This creates a risk of conflict. 
This paper takes a theoretical approach to derive some practical advice for officials. It 
considers whether the nature of government imposes a limit on the ability of partnerships 
between government and non-government entities to create public value. 1 It then considers 
the implications of those limitations for the work of government officials. 
The next section contains a brief scan ofrecent literature on collaborative governance, 
including partnerships, focusing particularly on guidance for officials. The following three 
1 In that context the nature of a partnership ( or collaboration or network) is immaterial, and various terms for 
different types of partnerships are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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sections construct an analysis which posits the necessary conditions for partnerships to 
contribute to public value. The implications of those conditions are then considered and the 
paper concludes with some thoughts for the future. 
Partnership, Government and Public value 
Partnerships and associated ideas of collaborative governance (including networks, 
cooperation, coordination, and co-production) have received considerable academic attention 
in recent decades (Alford and O'Flynn 2012 contains a good account of the issues; for a New 
Zealand perspective see Ryan 2011, 92-100). This paper does not attempt to review that 
literature; rather it uses a selection of recent articles to sketch a picture of some disparities 
and commonalities in current thinking, and the implications for practitioners. This part of the 
paper takes an inclusive view of the range of processes and structures involved in 
collaborative governance; a particular definition of partnerships is adopted later. 
Articles on collaborative governance vary between the practical "how-to-do-it" at one end 
and the abstract, even abstruse, at the other. One of the most practical is by Pro van and 
Lemaire (2012); they use a straightforward approach, reviewing articles on networks in 
several disciplines in order to identify processes that work well. These include: human 
involvement at many levels; network design; appropriate governance of the network; 
legitimacy (internally as perceived by members and externally as perceived by potential 
members and users); and stability (p. 643). Their list does not extend to wider issues of 
political acceptability or of the legitimacy of government processes; in essence their approach 
is managerial. 
Lewis (2011) is more theoretical; her focus is on the interactions that make a network. She 
points to lessons from research that suggest the success of networks is related to management 
rather than organisational form (p. 1230), informal rather than formal connections (p. 1231 ), 
and the "embeddedness" ofrelationships (p. 1231 ). As with Pro van and Lemaire (2012), 
these conclusions point practitioners towards interactions within networks and say little about 
the wider polity. 
Bevir and Richards (2009) are at the abstract end of the spectrum as they discuss a 
"decentred" analysis of policy networks. They suggest that analysing networks as entities 
with objective characteristics effectively imposes a presumption onto the analysis. Instead, 
they propose looking at the beliefs that participants bring to interactions, because those 
beliefs shape the networks they operate in. As a result they see "no necessary logical or 
structural process determining the form networks take, or whether they succeed or fail" (p. 
12). Accordingly, though officials might learn from each other's experience, they should be 
aware that the approaches (narratives) that work in one tradition may not translate elsewhere. 
The analysis offered by Pedersen, Sehested and S0rensen, (2010), is not decentred but "pluri-
centred" as public and private actors interact to achieve coordination. These authors offer an 
optimistic view of "planning in disorder" (p. 385) in which "moments ofrelative fixation" (p. 
388) can be the basis for coordination. Their advice to practitioners is summed up in the Zen-
like thought that "coordination is about striking the right balance between fixation and 
5 
Limits to Partnerships: Mark Prebble 
flexibility, between control and autonomy, between unity and diversity, and between 
simplicity and complexity" (p. 388). As with Bevir and Richards, they have little direct 
advice for officials. 
Among those who write on practical themes, some are more optimistic than others about the 
potential of collaborative governance. For example, Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2012) 
review the literature to draw out a general framework for analysis of collaborative 
governance. Their work approaches the specificity of a wiring diagram as they describe a 
regime in which four drivers operate through three dynamics, influenced by twelve elements, 
all summarised in ten propositions. There is much for practitioners to use here, including 
leadership, goal specification, shared theories of action, shared knowledge and mutual trust 
(among others), but the framework seems both over-determined and optimistic. The ten 
propositions are all unidirectional and open-ended, implying that applying more of the things 
that allow collaborative governance would lead to more and more successful collaboration. 
That seems implausible; if it were true perhaps the world would be dominated by 
collaboration. Their conclusions may relate to the emphasis on internal dynamics compared 
to the passing treatment of the wider political context. 
McGuire and Agranoff (2011) are more measured as they explore the limits to network 
approaches to government. They see operational limits that affect the interaction between 
network members; performance limits (including measurement problems) which make it hard 
to achieve tangible success; and bureaucratic limits, which relate to the role of officials and 
their responsibilities for matters beyond the network. They see network approaches as 
offering different means for officials to interact with the community, but not changing the 
essential nature of the government with its unique control of "decision authority, budgets, 
personnel, and democratic legitimization" (p. 271 ). 
Unlike the other papers cited here, McGuire and Agranoff see the nature of government as an 
essential aspect which affects the ability of officials to act in partnerships with others. They 
are not alone in that view; for example Alford and Hughes (2008, p. 140) point out that 
public officials' attempts to build trusting and flexible relationships with partners can be 
hampered by requirements of public accountability, changes in political leadership, 
competing intra-government priorities, and inertia. Some of those issues can be addressed by 
good network management, but some cannot; they require a wider perspective. 
But if successful partnerships depend on more than good network management, what is the 
underlying source of the limitation on collaborative governance? And why are the 
implications of those limits and the options available to officials not more evident in much 
network analysis? This paper suggests that limits on collaborative governance arise from the 
nature of government. The practical implications of those limits are often overlooked because 
many studies are not bedded in a theory of government and, of those that do have a 
theoretical component, the theories are often based on institutions and interactions rather than 
on the actions of people. 
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Indeed, some approaches reflect a theory of government that acknowledges no special 
characteristics of the government as a player; Kooiman (2003), for example, defines 
government as ''the totality of interactions" (p. 4) involved in addressing social issues, with 
no particular role for the state or officials. Such approaches may be very illuminating on 
questions of how social interactions might contribute to collective wellbeing, but offer little 
practical advice for officials. Alternatively, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) acknowledge 
special characteristics of government, including "sizeable budgets and personnel, special 
powers, access to mass media, a monopoly on the use of force and democratic legitimization" 
(p. 151). This is closer to the world in which officials work, but it includes a number of 
aspects (like large budgets or access to media) which can apply to many large organisations. 
It would be clearer to focus particularly on the matter that sets the government apart from all 
other organisations - the monopoly on the lawful use of force. 
Discussion of governance based on the analysis of interactions can be very illuminating for 
those wishing to consider how social processes evolve, but it can be opaque for a practitioner 
looking for advice on what works. Analysis of governance as a process done by people 
(within a social and institutional context) is more likely to relate directly to the issues that 
practitioners face. Analysis based on explicit assumptions about the nature of people as the 
unit of analysis is not common in the literature on collaborative governance. That may partly 
be because much individual-based theory uses the rational self-interested person, and that 
doesn't seem to fit a discussion of cooperative modes of governance. This paper avoids that 
problem by adopting a set of understandings of the person specifically adapted for analysing 
issues of public administration. 
The approach in this paper aims to ensure that insights are relevant to practitioners working 
in public administration by locating the analysis within an understanding of the work that 
officials do and the responsibilities they discharge. The roles that people play are central to an 
understanding of how they might best behave, and some insight into the nature of people is 
necessary to venture ideas on how they can behave. Accordingly the analysis begins from an 
understanding of the nature of government, and of the people involved in any aspect of 
partnerships. When combined with definitions of partnerships (specifically involving public 
and private sector participants) and of public values this paper aims to construct from first 
principles a simple theoretical understanding so that partnerships, networks or collaborative 
governance can be seen as more than "metaphors" (Dowding 1995). 
The method used here draws from economics. In particular the graphical presentation is 
similar to using a production possibility frontier and community preferences to locate a 
preferred solution. However, the building blocks (especially the nature of people) and the 
results are different from most economic analysis. 
The theory is built by stepping back from the colour and confusion ofreal-world examples 
and starting instead with the simplest possible concept of a state and its processes. From that 
simple case a more complex analysis is used to arrive at a statement of the limits on 
partnerships involving public and private groups. The formal approach used here has the 
disadvantage of abstracting from real situations, but the advantage of minimising confusion. 
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In particular, if the results of the analysis point to conclusions different from those found 
elsewhere in the literature, a formal process should make clear where that difference has 
ansen. 
The next section outlines characteristics of people, government, partnerships and public 
value; these are the core definitions and assumptions that underpin the analysis. An extremely 
simple form of society and government is outlined so that the essence of partnerships can be 
explored without real-world complexity. That analysis is then broadened into a more complex 
(but still abstract) society, in order to consider the generality of the ideas identified in the 
context of a simple society; in that process the necessary conditions (and therefore the limits) 
for sustainable partnerships are derived. The implications of those limits on the work of 
practitioners are then considered. 
Building-Blocks for Analysis 
People: In this paper people are assumed to be reasonable - this is not meant to imply that 
they behave in a reasonable way, rather it refers to the fact that they are able to reason when 
they choose to do so. Reasonable people have limited information (that is, information has a 
cost), and have the following characteristics: 
1. Heuristic thinking: people have capacity for rational thought, but a propensity to 
intuitive decision-making using rules of thumb. 
2. Heterogeneous preferences: people can decide which of two states is preferred, or 
whether they are indifferent between them. Because much decision-making is intuitive, 
these preferences may be unstable and mutually inconsistent. Preferences for any state 
are distributed across the population. Initially these preferences are assumed to be 
distributed randomly; that assumption is changed later. 
3. Pragmatism: when considering matters of joint endeavour, people accept approaches 
that they think will work. Personal flexibility is valued, but where some fonn of state 
control offers better general benefits than can be achieved by private means then public 
control is accepted. That is, there are no ideological priors about the government or its 
role. 
A further couple of characteristics arise from how people respond to limited information, as 
follows: 
4. Substantive honesty: people are generally honest but at times they may be opportunistic 
and let self-interest defeat their obligations to others. 
5. Experiential learning: though capable of evidence-based enquiry, much learning is 
based on personal experience or knowledge passed on from associates. 
Government: Government is a social creation which exists to achieve improvements in social 
states beyond what could be achieved without a government. Like many other entities, 
governments may be large, complex, and subject to some form of democratic control, but the 
feature that sets government apart is its lawful power to require compliance from those within 
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the government's area of control. That is, government is a process run by people by which 
public authority is used to achieve public value. 
Public value: Public value derives from actions of the government (and associated entities) 
that affect the lives of people - the public. It has been described as the value created by the 
government (Kelly et al 2002, p. 4) but that value does not exist in isolation rather it "is 
rooted in the desires and perceptions of individuals" (Moore 1995, p. 52). However, though 
value is found in the lives and aspirations of people, it is not the sum of private interests; it 
also reflects an understanding of the common good. Pragmatism (see above) means that 
people generally have a concern for the common good. Any assessment of public value must 
take account of the cost to the public in the form ofresources or powers used by the 
government. That is, public value is a net concept which measures the gain to the public from 
government activity. 
Partnerships: A partnership is some arrangement or pattern of behaviour by which (some part 
of) the government works with a community to adapt the provision of government services to 
provide enhanced public value for that community, where each community is a subset of the 
polity which the government serves. Though the term partnership implies equality between 
the partners, and that may be the ideal that participants hope to achieve, the unique nature of 
government as defined here means that no public/private partnership can be equal. That is, 
partnership is a tool available to governments by which aspects of policy or delivery of public 
services are adapted to meet the needs or wishes of a community; sometimes this involves a 
contribution of information, expertise, or other resources from within that community. 
These concepts of people, government, public value and partnership will be applied to a very 
simple society in the following section. 
Single-Product, Single-Activity Society 
Scenario2 : Imagine a citizen community on an island in a river delta. The island is subject to 
:frequent but unpredictable floods which destroy the harvest. All citizens ( other than 
government employees) are involved in raising crops; the production of crops is directly 
proportional to the labour exerted in cultivation, other than occasional losses caused by 
floods. It is possible to mitigate the risk of flooding by constructing levees. However, any 
target level of flood security can only be met if the levee is constructed to the same height all 
around the island. Levees must be maintained each year, thus this is a one-decision repeat 
game. 
Enjoyment of flood-security is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, i.e. flood levees are a 
classic public good (Samuelson, 1954). Because of heterogeneous preferences, no person can 
assume that the willing actions of others will lead to voluntary construction of a levee to the 
height that any individual may prefer. Even if promises were made to build such a levee, the 
risk of opportunistic slacking ( caused by the limits to substantive honesty) and problems of 
2 This follows and extends the approach in Prebble (2012). 
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information costs mean that nobody can plan on any level of flood security, unless the 
government compels contributions to the effort ofbuilding levees. 
Government activity: The government manages one activity, the construction of levees. 
Levee construction is planned and supervised by government employees, who enforce 
contributions from all citizens. Citizen contributions may be labour (which means citizens are 
diverted from working in the fields and therefore food production drops) or food (to feed 
government employees and those who are working on the levees). 
The aim of the government is to achieve the optimal level of flood protection. Every increase 
in levee construction reduces the risk oflost crops, but at the cost ofreducing current crop 
production. The construction of levees depends on the contribution made by citizens. 
Everyone is pragmatic, so that effort is willingly offered by most citizens ( except for some 
opportunism) to the extent that they agree that levee construction is valuable to the 
community. 
However, some citizens regard any level of levee construction as a wasted effort. Such people 
are likely to put in less effort than others unless the coercion is so great that it cannot be 
resisted. This avoidance is on top of the avoidance behaviour of opportunists. As the levees 
rise, the proportion of the population that is reluctant also rises. As more and more effort is 
diverted to flood security, the productivity of extra coercion may become negative. This is 
because the process of avoiding (or enduring) coercive force would outweigh effort put in by 
an increasingly reluctant ( and hungry) labour force. 
The relationship between government activity and the construction of levees is shown in 
Figure 1. The use of labour (and the availability of food for private consumption) is measured 
on the horizontal axis, from zero to one. At the origin all labour is diverted to building levees 
or feeding levee builders, and there is zero labour for producing food for private 
consumption. Though this point is shown with a positive levee-height, construction is not 
l tnt 
H•ighc 
0 
Fi'1)re l 
Outcome Cun ·e 
H 
Food 
Production 
Fieure 2 
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indefinitely sustainable at this rate. At the right hand end of the horizontal axis, all labour is 
available for the production of food for private consumption, except for the modest tax to 
feed permanent government employees, who presumably do very little at that point because 
no levees are being built. 
The vertical axis measures the height of the levees and therefore the level of flood protection. 
The curve o-o is an outcome curve; it measures the level of flood protection that the 
government can achieve for any given diversion of available labour using existing 
technology. 3 Point H measures the highest possible levee using available technology. 
Preferences: Every person has their own preferred combination of food consumption and 
flood security. Heuristic thinking means that these preferences are not always consistent, but 
this does not mean that decisions are so capricious they cannot be understood. In general 
everyone wants some security and some food, and if they are to lose one of these things they 
need to be compensated by some of the other if they are to remain equally happy. As either 
food or security reduces towards zero, the amount of the other that is required to compensate 
for the loss of the scarce item will rise. Eventually, once food or security are at an irreducible 
minimum, then no extra provision of the other item will be enough to compensate for further 
loss of the scarce item. 
Preferences can be plotted for every person as a trade-off curve. Each curve plots the locus of 
all equally-valued sets of food and security for an individual. The nature of the trade-offs 
described in the previous paragraph means that such trade-off curves are convex to the 
origin.4 There is a (potentially infinite) number of curves for each person; curves that are 
further from the origin represent larger combinations of food and security, so are preferable 
to curves that are closer to the origin. 
A set of trade-off curves for one person are shown in Figure 2. Point I is the place where the 
highest trade-off curve touches the outcome curve; that represents the optimal level of food 
and security for that person. Similar sets of trade-off curves could be drawn for every 
inhabitant of the island, and (because of heterogeneous preferences) optimal food/security 
combinations for different people will be distributed all along the outcome curve from point 
H rightwards. Positions to the left of H will only interest masochists because the same levels 
of flood security are available to the right of Hin combination with less coercion and more 
food consumption. Point H will only interest those who regard the highest available levee 
height as equal to or lower than their irreducible minimum for flood security; that is, those 
people are totally risk averse within the range oflevee heights that are available using current 
technology. 
3 As well as the motivation of workers, technology also implies that the outcome curve will be concave. For 
example, every extra centimetre oflevee-height demands a stronger and wider foundation, and the last hectares 
brought into food production are likely to be less accessible or productive than the first. 
4 At one extreme as food consumption reaches the irreducible minimum these curves would be vertical and at 
the other as flood protection reaches its minin1um they would be horizontal, but in the zones plotted they are 
convex curves. 
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Decision-making: Each year democratic means are used to determine the height of the levees 
and therefore the contribution of labour or food that will be required from each citizen. 
Democracy might involve a plebiscite on levee levels, or annual election for a governor to 
determine their height. Either way, over time the result is clear; the height of the levee will be 
set in line with the preferences of the median voter (Downs, 1957). 
For simplicity, assume that the person whose preferences are shown in figure 2 is the median 
voter; this means that the levees will be built to h1 and citizen contributions will be required 
at c1. With available technology, point I is the point that the public finds most satisfactory; it 
approximates the highest available public value. 
Potential for improvement: Though point I has emerged from a democratic process, that does 
not mean that everybody is happy. To the right of point I are people who would rather make 
less communal contribution and accept a higher risk of floods. To the left are people who 
would willingly contribute more (and wish that everybody else would contribute more) so 
they can achieve greater flood security. 
In addition, point I is not necessarily the best possible state that society could aspire to - it is 
simply the best it can get using current technology. The role of government employees is to 
devise efficient means of building levees. If they designed a productivity-improving shovel 
they could raise the outcome curve across the whole range; that would lift every person to a 
higher trade-off curve and so shift society to a preferred position. But the shape of the 
outcome curve demonstrates that public results are not achieved solely by the efforts of 
government employees. The behaviour of citizens is critical. 
Instead of focussing on technical fixes, government employees might come up with a way to 
nudge citizen preferences and behaviour. Perhaps they might introduce communal singing 
during levee construction; this might make levee construction so popular that preferences 
change and the median voter selects higher levees and more citizen contributions. More 
significantly, the joy of communal singing might induce more rhythm and coordination so the 
dirt is moved quicker and productivity is improved. That too would lift the outcome curve 
and improve public value. 5 That is, government employees may devise methods of work 
which make citizens into more enthusiastic or effective co-producers. 
Clustered preferences: Issues of organising co-production and partnering become clear with a 
small change in the scenario. Assume that the island has a peninsula, attached to the rest of 
the island by a narrow isthmus, so that it would be technically feasible to construct the levee 
aroru1d the peninsula at a different height from the rest of the island, with a flood gate at the 
isthmus. Also assume that the community living on the peninsula includes an unusually high 
proportion of people who favour more flood protection than the norm for the polity as a 
whole. Government employees have an opportunity to develop a special program of flood 
protection for the peninsula in partnership with the community living there. The question of 
5 Any lift in the outcome curve allows the polity to access a new and higher set of public value results; the 
choice of where they settle along the curve is a distinct issue in this analysis, but the range of choices is always 
enhanced by lifting the outcome curve. 
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interest is what conditions are needed for that partnership to improve public value? That 
depends on the value accruing to the whole polity, peninsula-dwellers and others 
("mainlanders"). 
Figure 3 shows two trade-off curves. The first curve is the same median-voter trade-off curve 
as in figure 2, touching the outcome curve at point I . The other curve reflects the median 
voter of the community living on the peninsula, touching the outcome curve at point P. For 
the peninsula community point I is inferior to point P because point I lies on a lower trade-off 
curve. 
Government employees could enter into a partnership with the peninsula community to raise 
levees around the peninsula to h2, while maintaining the levee around the mainland at h1. 
Though this will require extra labour to build the higher levees, this change would improve 
the value enjoyed by peninsula residents because it moves them along the outcome curve to 
their preferred position. This meets a basic requirement for improving public value. 
Benefits of partnership: Assessing the net impact on public value for the polity as a whole 
depends on the effect on the rest of the population. There are two issues to consider. First is 
whether the public-value gains for one group are offset by losses elsewhere; ifthere are 
offsets the result is generally indeterminate, since it is difficult to compare benefits for one 
group with losses for another. The second test relates to the political sustainability of the 
special program. Irrespective of whether there are benefits for peninsula dwellers, the 
durability of those benefits depends on the willingness of mainlanders to condone the special 
program. 
Compulsory contributions are at the heart of the calculation of net benefits. Even if the 
peninsula provides all the labour to build the higher levee, if the workers who build the 
peninsula levee are fed from compulsory food contributions from mainlanders, then the 
outcome for mainlanders is no longer at point I. Mainlanders are still protected by a levee at 
h1, but their food available for private consumption is reduced to support the extra 
construction to get the peninsula levees to h2. Because the peninsula has only a small part of 
the coastline mainlanders will not need to contribute as much as c2, but they still suffer a food 
loss to C•. If peninsula levee construction is supported by island-wide contributions, point 
c•h1 is the new outcome for mainlanders. Compared to the situation without a partnership, 
peninsula-dwellers enjoy improved value by moving from point I to point P, but mainlanders 
are in a worse position than they were at point I. 
But the loss of value comparing c•h1 to point I is only part of the loss for mainlanders. The 
position of mainlanders is amplified in figure 4. Point I is still marked in the same place, and 
the peninsula-dwellers preference is shown touching the outcome curve at P, as in figure 3. 
As well as showing the median voter trade-off curve for the polity as a whole, figure 4 shows 
the median voter trade-off curve for mainland-dwellers (m-m). Since the mainland population 
excludes the peninsula, and peninsula dwellers include a disproportionate share of those who 
13 
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favour flood protection, the median-voter position among mainlanders is to the right of point 
I at M. That is, if they had been offered the choice mainlanders would have preferred levees 
as low as h3 for which they would happily have contributed c3_ Instead once the government 
has entered into a partnership with the peninsula community mainlanders are protected by 
levees higher than they would have chosen for themselves, and they are paying as well as for 
the extra-height levee around the peninsula. The disparity between mainlanders' preferred 
position of c3h3 and the partnership result (for mainlanders) of c*ht may be sufficiently 
annoying that mainlanders use their majority power to close the partnership arrangement. 
Sustainability of partnerships: There are several variants that might make arrangements more 
sustainable. For example, government employees might arrange with the peninsula dwellers 
that the costs of manual labour to raise the levee above h1 will be met entirely by the 
peninsula community. That reduces the impost on mainlanders, but does not remove it 
entirely. That is because government employees are involved in a more complex process than 
they were when they designed levees at a single height around the whole island. There are 
extra design costs and community liaison costs. The bureaucratic costs of designing and 
implementing two levee schemes might be as much as double the cost of a uniform scheme. 
In the overall scheme of things the cost of extra bureaucracy may be low, but it might be 
politically sensitive. 
Attempts to appease the mainlanders could lead to approaches that are not partnerships all. 
For example, if bureaucracy cost is removed by requiring peninsula-dwellers to do their own 
design and management, there is no longer a partnership because the government is making 
no contribution. Similarly, if the issue were addressed by allowing the peninsula to 
administer and fund its own levee-building scheme, and to stand aside from contributing to 
the levee around the rest of the island, the issue is no longer partnership but subsidiarity or 
independence. 
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The central point here is that unless the government moves to complete subsidiarity (without 
subsidies) partnerships involving the government must engage the public authority of the 
government in some way. That is a necessary part of providing partnership benefits for the 
partner community. But at the same time, because public authority is involved the rest of the 
polity is engaged and their interests must be considered. This is easy to see in the simplicity 
of a single-product single-activity society, but similar issues exist in more realistic scenarios. 
These are considered in the next section. 
Multi-Product, Multi-Activity Society 
The ideal state: If partnership is difficult in the stark example of a single-product single-
activity world, what happens in more realistic cases? Figure 2 can be adapted to illustrate the 
options in a multi-product multi-activity case. In figure 5 the vertical axis is a combined 
measure of all aspects of well-being and prosperity (outcomes) arising as a result of 
government activity. Figure 5 assumes away a central issue of public administration -
different aspects of public outcomes and public activity are deemed to be commensurable. 
Analytically that is difficult, but politicians manage this every day as they balance demands 
in many fields. Figure 5 can be seen as a drastically simplified version of the policy options 
as viewed by elected leaders. 
Figure 5 is an abstraction; like any model it does not purport to be a picture of the real world; 
rather it is designed to focus on key relationships. In this case the central issue is the 
relationship between the government's use of public authority and the potential effects on 
public value. The precision implied by figure 5 is spurious. Strictly, the curves should be 
broad and fuzzy, representing the imprecision of heuristic thinkers and the effect of averaging 
the benefits of many services among many citizens, and the intersections should show as 
zones rather than precise points. However, that caveat does not affect the logic of the diagram 
and it is easier to read as drawn. 
The horizontal axis measures public authority (rising from right to left) and its inverse, 
private autonomy (rising from left to right). At the origin public authority is maximised; as it 
drops, private autonomy increases. Private autonomy ranges from zero (at the origin where 
public authority is maximised) to one (to the right where public authority is nil). 6 
The government and its agents use public authority to achieve outcomes for the good of the 
public. The results occur partly as a direct consequence of government products and services 
(outputs). But the direct effects of outputs are only part of the story. Government activity also 
generates indirect effects as it influences the behaviour of others. For example public order is 
promoted by police who patrol the streets and arrest offenders. This is a direct effect of a 
government output. But members of the public who support the police by reporting offenders 
6 For this paper private autonomy is defined as the absence of public authority, so the use of public authority and 
the loss of private autonomy is a zero-sum game. In fact there are many aspects of public authority that protect 
various personal freedoms; in this paper such gains in personal freedom would be measured on the vertical 
access as social outcomes. 
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can substantially increase the effectiveness of police patrols. This is a complementary 
indirect effect of the use of public authority. There are many forms of volunteering or willing 
compliance with government activity which produce a complementary effect on outcomes. 
Indirect effects are not always positive. For example, some alienated people might react 
negatively to the presence of a police patrol leading to more disorder than would otherwise 
have happened; that is an offsetting indirect effect of government activity. Common offsetting 
effects include avoidance behaviour and crowding-out, where government activity displaces 
private activity directed to the same end. 
Once indirect effects are taken into account, the shape of the relationship between 
government activity (as measured by the use of public authority) and public outcomes is 
predictable. Each increase in public authority (using the same technology) will tend to 
enhance the intended public outcome, but by a decreasing amount as government activity 
increases. This is a result of heterogeneity. As government activity increases, an increasing 
proportion of the population disagree with the program and indirect offsetting behaviour will 
rise as otherwise compliant people are less likely to volunteer in support of the program or 
even start to evade their obligations. Eventually as government activity rises to very high 
levels public opposition may be so substantial that increases in government activity lead to 
reductions in public outcomes. That relationship is drawn as the outcome curve o-o in figure 
5. 
The public value of a public outcome depends on the views of the public. Because people are 
pragmatic there is general acceptance of activities that have a public benefit, so constructive 
use of public authority (and the consequent abridgement of private autonomy) is generally 
supported. However, heterogeneity means that there is always debate about the preferred 
autonomy/outcome balance. 
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Trade-off curve i-i represents the collective views of the public about the range of outcomes 
that result from the direct and indirect effects of government activity. Point I is the outcome 
that society prefers. It represents the best possible public value using available technology; it 
is the ideal state. 
However, though point I is ideal, it is not possible because in a multi-activity world there can 
be no median voter. Once heterogeneous people are faced with options involving a number of 
dimensions their preferences cannot be summed. Arrow (1950) demonstrated that summing 
preferences to reach a social optimum is a logical impossibility for a society of rational 
people. In a society ofreasonable people as defined in this paper the ideal state conceivably 
could occur as heuristic (and therefore inconsistent) thinkers might coincide in the ordering 
of their preferences, but that would only be a fleeting event. 
For practical purposes the ideal state is an aspirational goal, bedevilled by information costs, 
transaction costs, inertia, opportunism and associated chaos. Despite those problems, the aim 
of government employees is to produce outputs that will achieve the best possible public 
value, as represented by the ideal state. 
Officials' efforts to achieve higher public value involve three types of effort. First, they may 
attempt to increase outputs by improving productivity of public activities; this would lift the 
outcome curve as a direct result of their efforts. Second they may devise methods to 
encourage or cajole the public into more positive responses to public endeavours; improved 
compliance or increased volunteering would lift the outcome curve as an indirect result of 
public activity. Third, by advocating or implementing different combinations or intensities of 
activities within the available bundle of public activities, officials might achieve a shift along 
the horizontal axis and therefore along the outcome curve; depending on the shape of public 
preferences, a shift along the curve could result in a move to a higher trade-off curve and 
therefore to higher public value. Implementing partnerships might involve either or both of 
the second and third of those approaches. 
The role of partnerships: One of the problems in aiming for the ideal state stems from 
heterogeneity. Though point I is supposedly the point where collective preferences meet 
available outcomes, the discussion above demonstrated that in the absence of any median 
voter or another means of identifying a collective preference there is no such point. In a 
centralised government process every person faces the same range of government activity at 
the same cost in terms of private autonomy (c1) , but preferences vary for individuals and 
groups. Many may be broadly contented with the benefits implied by outcomes at b1 but 
others would prefer different combinations of obligations and outcomes. Information costs 
make it difficult to identify those who do not value the set of government activities that are 
on offer. 7 Accordingly, trade-off curves are dropped for the rest of the analysis. Instead 
7 A further point is that problems of access (such as language or culture, not just preferences) may restrict the 
ability of some communities to enjoy all the benefits of a given level of government activity; for such groups the 
outcome would fall inside the outcome curve. That case is not teased out in this paper because the implications 
for partnerships are similar to those involved in addressing heterogeneous preferences; in this paper 
heterogeneous preferences are just one form of heterogeneity. 
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results are generated from analysing the effect of government policies on the outcome curve; 
this is closer to the process that happens as officials interact with community groups. 
Partnering is one way to mitigate the problems of information costs and heterogeneity. This is 
particularly relevant complex and intractable issues (''wicked problems," Rittel and Webber, 
1973). Rather than delivering one policy set for everyone, government employees might work 
with different communities to identify nuances of preference about the nature of programs so 
that different groups might get closer to their preferred position. 
A successful partnering program might aim for a result like p* in figure 6, where there is an 
additional outcome curve, op-o; that curve shows the outcome for a partner community. It is 
drawn above the outcome curve for the polity, because the process of partnership has 
produced a complementary indirect effect as members of the community have altered their 
behaviour in response to the provisions of the partnership. Altered behaviour might involve 
taking up available services, such as more parents voluntarily presenting children for 
inoculation. Alternatively it might involve volunteering, such as participating in 
neighbourhood watch programs so that members of the community add their efforts to those 
of officials. 
At p* the partner community enjoys better outcomes; it receives those benefits at no cost in 
terms of increased use of public authority, so the rest of the polity is unaffected. In this case 
public value is enhanced because the partner community receives improved outcomes and the 
rest of the population (the residual, R) are unaffected. The point p * represents an ideal 
partnership, in a similar way that I represents the ideal state for the polity as a whole. An 
ideal partnership, achieves its results entirely by changes in the behaviour of the partner 
community; there is no extra use of public resources or changed use ofregulations. As a 
result there is no change in the position of the rest of the polity. Mainstream programs 
continue to get most of the population somewhere close to I , and partnering lifts communities 
to better results. In that case public value is enhanced by partnering. 
However, like the ideal state, the ideal partnership is effectively unattainable, because it is 
hard to envisage a partnership program that involves no change in the use of public authority. 
An exploration of the connection between partnerships and public value requires some more 
plausible examples than the ideal partnership of figure 6. 
Partnerships and public value: The most likely change in the use of public authority as part 
of a partnership is the provision of extra public resources. That case is shown in figure 7. It 
shows outcome curves for the polity and for the partner community, as in figure 6, but the 
result for the partner community is not p *, but P 1• At P1 additional public authority is engaged 
because the partner community receives more resources than it received under mainstream 
practices. In the example given above, the success of providing more inoculations comes at 
the cost of more vaccine. Unless the extra services are provided entirely from pre-existing 
unutilised public resources, 8 there is a cost to be carried by someone, but it is in the nature of 
8 In a well-managed government system the existence of unutilised idle public resources is unlikely at any time 
and very unlikely after a period of austerity. 
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a public/private partnership that the public cost is not carried by the partner community. The 
point of the partnership is that the community are beneficiaries and the cost of the service will 
fall on the rest of the polity who may be described as "obligatees" (Alford, 2001). 
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In figure 7 the impact of this additional cost on the rest of the polity is shown as a shift from/ 
(the position without a partnership) to R1. At R1 the residual continues to receive the same 
benefits as before, but at a (slightly) higher cost; they are less well-off as a result of the 
partnership. The net result for public value is indeterminate; it depends on the relative size of 
the partner community and the residual and the distribution of gains and losses for each 
group. More patticularly, sustainability of a pattnership <lepen<ls nul jusl on ils management, 
but also on how the rest of the polity views the imposition of additional costs. It may be that 
the costs are too small to be salient, or the residual may accept that the special needs of the 
partner community demand extra and different services. But if the rest of the polity resents 
carrying the costs of the partnership it may be unsustainable. 
Figure 8 explores another possibility. Irrespective of the provision of public resources many 
partnerships involve variations in the terms of provision of government support. For example, 
income tests that are based on the position of an individual might be varied to take account of 
obligations to a wider group, with the result that more members of a partner community 
might be eligible for government assistance. In the conceptual presentation used in this paper, 
such variances would show as relaxations of public authority, because members of a 
community are exempted from various provisions that apply to the mainstream. In a 
successful partnership this greater flexibility encourages a complementary indirect response 
from the community (as shown by the raised outcome curve op-o). The result for the partner 
c01mnunity is at P2 ; this is to the right of p *, reflecting the reduced obligations faced by the 
partner community. 
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Partnerships that derive their results from special ( especially relaxed) regulations for partner 
communities can produce an indirect effect on the rest of the population. In most cases there 
may be little effect, but if enough of the rest of the population considers that the special 
regulations are unfair or improper then there could be an offsetting indirect effect. That is, if 
the rest of the population is sufficiently concerned about relaxed provisions enjoyed by 
partner communities they may become less compliant in various areas, including in payment 
of tax. If the disillusionment is sufficient the outcome curve for the residual of the population 
might drop; this is shown as or-o in figure 8. The final result for the rest of the polity, R2, 
could be at various points along the new outcome curve, but wherever things settle the value 
for the rest of the polity is reduced because the result lies on a lower outcome curve than the 
non-partnership case. 
As with the case where extra public resource was involved, the impact on public value may 
be indeterminate. However, if the effect of the partnership is to reduce the outcome curve for 
the rest of the population, then the legitimacy of the government has been called into 
question. That is, if the residual are so affronted by the special opportunities offered to a 
partner community that many people withhold cooperation from the government, it is 
unlikely that public value could be enhanced. 
Necessary conditions for enhancing public value: The three partnership results shown in 
figures 6 to 8 illustrate the way that partnerships can enhance public value, but also the limits 
to that effect. First, partnerships can succeed only if they lift results for partner groups, and 
this generally requires some complementary indirect response from the partner community. 
Second, where partnerships are supported by extra resources provided from the rest of the 
polity their ongoing success depends on the acceptability of that transfer. Third, where 
partnerships are characterised by relaxed regulation of a partner community public value can 
be enhanced only if the rest of the community is indifferent to (or supports) those special 
prov1s1ons. 
This can be rephrased in slightly more formal terms as follows: 
The necessary conditions for partnering to enhance public value on a sustainable basis 
are: 
1. Benefit: the partnership must deliver results that are better for the target community 
than were achieved in the mainstream program; 
2. Support: the costs (resource or otherwise) to the rest of the polity must be less than the 
benefits to the partner community and the transfer of benefits must have sufficient 
endorsement for the partnership to continue; and 
3. Acceptability: the administration of the partnering program must generate minimal (or 
favourable) reaction from the rest of the polity. 
In terms of graphical presentation in this paper, these conditions translate as: for public value 
to increase, partner communities must reach preferred places along or above the outcome 
curve and the residual must remain somewhere close to the ideal state position I because 
either they agree that special support for the partner community bestows public value or they 
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are indifferent to the existence of the partnership. This suggests that the necessary conditions 
for a successful partnership program are wider than successfully managing the relationship 
between the partners. 
Implications for Partnering 
No government system could ever assemble the information needed to arrive at the ideal 
state. But that does not make the analysis irrelevant. For officials there is a close real-world 
equivalent to the stylised case of figure 6; the aim is to use partnerships to improve public 
value for communities more than would have been achieved otherwise, while maintaining 
public value for the rest of the polity. The three conditions for successful partnering that are 
derived above apply in real situations, and they push government employees in different 
directions, and towards different intellectual traditions - management, politics and public 
administration. 
Benefit: The first condition stipulates that the partnership must benefit the target community. 
This is consistent with the approach of Provan and Milward (2001 , 416): "at the broadest 
level of analysis community-based networks must be judged by the contribution they make to 
the communities they are trying to serve ... " However, some see partnerships as potentially 
beneficial irrespective of their results. For example McGuire and Agranoff suggest "there 
could be a 'good' network but poor program outcomes" (2001, 273). In the analysis in this 
paper, that could only be so if the partner community attached so much value to interaction 
with the government that other factors were trivial. That might be possible at the opening 
stages of a relationship, but it hardly seems likely to be a sustainable result. 
So, if results matter, that raises issues of the design and delivery of each partnership. It directs 
the official towards a managerial approach, but one which is built on open and trusting 
relationships. Management is lifted from organisational supervision to stewardship for the 
community. The prescriptions offered by Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos (2010), Provan and 
Lemaire (2012), Lewis (2011), Emerson et al (2012) and many others offer a range of matters 
that must be attended to. All of these call for particular skills and application by government 
employees as they deal with partner communities. 
Whether these approaches are sufficient to ensure that partnerships succeed for their 
participants is uncertain. Provan and Lemaire acknowledge there is little evidence that 
partnerships succeed at the outcome level (2012, 64 3 ), but Turrini et al (2010) mined the 
literature to find managerial practices that contribute to the success of partnerships in 
producing improved results. Whether particular managerial practices promote success is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems reasonable to suggest that there are sets of 
practices that will enhance the success of partnership programs and that those practices 
should be used. 
The second and third conditions tum the official's attention to the rest of the polity. In 
support of this, Turrini et al cite evidence that support from the "broader community" tends 
to promote successful results (2010, 540). However, before considering what might elicit the 
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necessary public support, this paper suggests it is helpful to first consider which of the two 
conditions apply. 
Support: The support condition has two parts. First, if the partnership confers less benefit 
than it costs then it cannot be said to create public value; that follows directly from the 
definition of public value. Second, the condition states that if enough members of the wider 
polity perceive that members of partnerships are benefiting at their expense and they do not 
like that result, then the partnership will not endure. This is not a management issue as 
management is traditionally understood; it is the stuff of politics. (However, strategic 
management, as advocated by Mark Moore (1995) suggests that officials cannot neglect 
political issues.) 
As expressed, the support condition makes partnerships look like a zero-sum game which will 
never be tolerated by others. In fact, partnerships seem to operate without complaint in many 
contexts. There may be various reasons why non-members of partnerships would knowingly 
accept special assistance to partners: redress for a past inequity; combating social threats 
stemming from alienation; improving prospects for economic growth by lifting the 
productivity of poorer groups; recognition of some special status (perhaps bestowed by a 
court order to meet a special need); or altruism. But unless one or more of these reasons have 
widespread acceptance, a partnership that provides special support to a community may have 
a short life. 
Meeting the support condition demands political sensitivity from government employees. 
How that sensitivity might be exhibited depends on the conventions of each polity. In some 
cases it might be appropriate for officials to argue the case for redistribution policies in 
public; in other contexts (like Westminster systems) more discretion may be needed (Alford 
and O'Flynn 2009 and Rhodes and Wanna 2009 offer contrasting perspectives on the issues 
involved in political management by officials). But whatever the context, officials need a 
good understanding of issues of political mandate and responsibility, lest they be swamped by 
a political backlash to a well-meaning program for a needy community. 
Acceptability: The acceptability condition offers hope of a less fraught life for officials, as it 
states that if preferences for the rest of the polity are unaffected by a partnership, then those 
preferences can be overlooked. In strict terms it is unlikely this condition could ever be met; 
everything affects everything and someone, somewhere will have a view on the most trivial 
matter. However, as a practical matter of administration the acceptability condition directs the 
government employee to considering whether concerns from groups that are not part of the 
partnership are likely to be significant. As always this depends on where the media, bloggers, 
opposition politicians, chattering classes and taxi drivers direct their attention. What matters 
politically may vary from one polity to another and one characteristic of a good administrator 
is having a sense of what will be salient. 
The acceptability condition comes into question not when there is specific resentment about 
benefits delivered to a particular community (that relates to the support condition), but when 
the nature of the program or its administration offends a wider sense of what is proper or 
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reasonable among those who are not part of the partnership. It is not an issue of whether one 
group gets more than another, but whether the processes and options available to partners 
seem reasonable. The issue arises because the authority of the state is involved in the 
partnership; if that authority is used in a way that seems improper to others then that may be 
sufficient to undermine the legitimacy of the program. Worse, it might undermine the 
legitimacy of the government. 
Part of the origin of this concern is experiential learning, combined with the cost of 
information. People outside the partnership are aware that they cannot know what is going on 
in full detail. They also know that even if officials start a partnership with the best of 
intentions about the welfare of the polity at large the process of forming a trusting 
relationship with a community must affect the officials. Because of experiential learning and 
the fact that knowledge is influenced by associates, there is always a risk that officials will 
place disproportionate weight on the needs of the community that they work with. When this 
is combined with the likelihood that officials support the activities that they are associated 
with, there has to be a concern that enthusiasm on both sides of a partnership may lead to 
excessive sympathy for the needs of partner communities. 
The fact that partnerships are intended to allow flexible responsiveness to community needs 
raises the essential problem: government officials are supposed to work for the whole of the 
polity, but partnerships are intended to make them more sensitive to the needs of particular 
communities. Experiential learning means they will put extra weight on the problems that 
they come to know more about, and the cost of information makes it hard for outsiders to see 
when that problem starts. The possible risk of opportunism comes on top of this issue. 
These issues direct the official towards some traditional concerns of public administration, 
especially accountability. If critics can point to sloppy administration, questionable payments, 
dodgy tendering, weak evaluations or concerns from auditors, then the best-intentioned 
schemes can get into trouble. Since the heart of some partnerships is an aim to reduce 
compliance costs facing communities and to give them greater control of their lives, the 
acceptability condition can be problematic. 
Greater community control addresses issues of information costs and heterogeneous 
preferences and so increases the chance of meeting the benefit condition. But if that 
community control implies idiosyncratic administration and informal arrangements based on 
trust, there is an increased risk of irregular behaviour. This increases the chance that the 
acceptability condition will not be met. Irrespective of the support that might previously have 
been available for a particular partnership under the support condition, once people are 
sufficiently concerned that the acceptability condition is not met, it may be hard to maintain 
support for the partnership. 
In the Whanau Ora example at the opening to this paper there were insufficient data to 
establish that the program was delivering for its participants, and partner funds were diverted 
to purchase cannabis. That means the department is unable to demonstrate that it is meeting 
the benefit condition, and in at least one case it has clearly failed the acceptability condition. 
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As it happens, the political circumstances that led to the program mean it can survive these 
weaknesses in the meantime, but in the longer term this paper's analysis suggests that these 
issues need to be addressed if the program is to endure. 
Conclusion 
This paper has used a formal approach in an attempt to arrive at advice for practitioners. The 
success of such theorising can be assessed in several ways: does it arrive at unusual insights? 
Is it sufficiently general to have wide application? Does it produce testable hypotheses? And 
are its conclusions sufficiently tangible to be useful to practitioners? 
The test of insight is inspired by Dowding's (1995) criticism of the looseness of much 
analysis of networks, but also of his admonition about theorising, when he said: 
The paradox of formal analysis is that it must yield results which by and large fit with 
what we know by descriptive methods - otherwise we know something has gone wrong 
with our fonnal analysis. What we require to justify formalism is some surprising 
results, or paradoxical conclusions, which then justify closer qualitative analysis (156). 
It may not seem very paradoxical or surprising to conclude as this paper does that successful 
partnerships rely on attention to politics and to traditional matters of public administration, as 
well as to issues of network (or partnership) management. But if it is so obvious, why is the 
point not made more often in the literature on collaborative governance?9 
Second, it is reasonable to consider the plausibility and generality of the assumptions behind 
any theory. Again, in Dowding's words, "a true theory must be generalizable to all objects to 
which it is supposed to be applicable" (p. 140). In this paper that translates into whether the 
opening assumptions and definitions point appropriately to the world in which practitioners 
work, and whether the tests of benefit, support and acceptability apply across all (democratic) 
governments. 
The definition of government as the application of public authority to achieve public value is 
clearly abstract - it pays no regard to institutions or regulatory structures. But that is the 
means by which the analysis achieves generality while focussing on the one aspect (the 
lawful use of coercion) that sets government apart from all other activities. Similarly no 
person can be summed up in five characteristics, but as an abstraction, the reasonable person 
provides a basis to consider how people behave in matters involving public activities. 
Together the definitions of the government and of the reasonable person make for a 
parsimonious analysis of public administration in general and collaborative governance in 
particular. The conclusions may be simpler than might be found in a management manual, 
but their applicability is general. 
Third, does the theory produce testable hypotheses? In effect, this paper can be summarised 
as suggesting that predictors of success in public/private partnerships should be extended 
9 McGuire and Agranoff(2011) and Alford and Hughes (2008) provide examples of those who have looked 
more broadly than management, but even they have not pushed the analysis to its conclusion. 
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beyond managerial processes to include political circumstances beyond the partnership and 
the robustness of public administrative systems that are applied to the partnership. Personal 
experience is consistent with this hypothesis but the proposition could be checked 
empirically. 
The fourth test is whether the advice is comprehensible and useful to practitioners. From my 
experience in dealing with officials who were confused at the public turmoil that surrounded 
their well-meant mistakes, some clear advice about the need to attend to politics and the 
basics of public administration, as well as to managing within their networks, would have 
been very helpful. Hopefully an explanation of the dynamics in the simplicity developed in 
this paper may help to make the reasons for those basic messages more widely understood. 
Clearly this paper does not give a practitioner's guide to the management of partnerships; that 
was never its intention. Nor does it provide a diagnosis for the management of the Whanau 
Ora program or for similar schemes in New Zealand or Australia. However, practitioners 
following the advice in this paper will be clear on the need to attend to issues of benefit, 
support and acceptability. In the process they will need to attend to public administration, 
politics and management - and that is no bad thing. 
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